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People often form intentions but fail to follow through on them. Mounting evidence suggests that such inten-
tion-action gaps can be narrowed with prompts to make concrete plans about when, where, and how to act to
achieve the intention. In this paper, we pushed the notion of plan-concreteness to test the efficacy of a prompt
under a minimalist automated calling setting, where respondents were only prompted to indicate a narrower
duration within which they intent to act. In a field experiment, this planning prompt significantly helped peo-
ple to pay their past dues and get out of debt delinquency. These results suggest that minimalist automatic
planning prompts are a scalable, cost-effective intervention.
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Consumers commonly fail to act on their intentions,
even in settings when it is beneficial for them to do
so, such as improving their health or financial
standing. Mounting evidence suggests that concrete
action plans about when, where, and how to act can
increase the likelihood that they will achieve their
goals (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2014). Indeed, asking
consumers to form concrete implementation inten-
tions has been shown to help them have a healthier
diet (Adriaanse, Vinkers, De Ridder, Hox, & De
Wit, 2011), increase the frequency of physical activ-
ity (Belanger-Gravel, Godin, & Amireault, 2013),
engage in preventative health behaviors (Brown,
Sheeran, & Reuber, 2009; Martin, Sheeran, Slade,
Wright, & Dibble, 2009; Milkman, Beshears, Choi,
Laibson, & Madrian, 2011; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999),
complete assignments in a timely fashion
(Gollwitzer & Brandst€atter, 1997), engage in
environmentally friendly behaviors (Bamberg, 2002;
Holland, Aarts, & Langendam, 2006), and increase
the likelihood of voting (Nickerson & Rogers, 2010).
Overall, a meta-analysis found that implementa-
tion intention interventions have a medium to large
effect on goal attainment (Gollwitzer & Sheeran,
2006). In addition, prior research has identified some
of the boundaries for this effect. Planning prompts
have been shown to be more effective when goal
intentions are strong (Gollwitzer, 1999; Koestner,
Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 2002; Orbell, Hodgkins,
& Sheeran, 1997; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer,
2005), when there is a strong commitment to the
implementation intentions (Achtziger, Bayer, & Goll-
witzer, 2012; Gollwitzer, 1999), when goals are diffi-
cult to achieve (Gollwitzer & Brandst€atter, 1997;
Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) and for populations
who have problems with action control (Gollwitzer
& Sheeran, 2006; Hall, Zehr, Ng, & Zanna, 2012).
Nonetheless, many questions remain about how
minimal a planning prompt can be to be effective
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in real world consumer decisions. This is an essen-
tial question since the majority of the demonstra-
tions involving planning prompts have involved
small laboratory-based studies, whose effects do
not always generalize to real-world behaviors
(Frederick, Lee, & Baskin, 2014; Lynch, 1999). More-
over, the few demonstrations involving large-scale
field experiments (e.g., Milkman et al., 2011; Nick-
erson & Rogers, 2010) have involved costly manip-
ulations for nonroutine actions (e.g., voting or
attending a preventive screening), such as personal-
ized calls that discuss how one would go about ful-
filling one’s plan or physical reminders with a
specific date/time. Given that planning prompts
can generate scalable interventions while preserving
individual liberty, it is valuable to examine their
generalizability and effectiveness in more routine
consumer settings (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2009). In
addition, understanding to what extent minimalist
planning prompts can work is essential for firms,
who are concerned about the cost-effectiveness of
these interventions.
In this project, we tested the effectiveness of a
minimal planning prompt in a setting where con-
sumers fail to perform an otherwise routine action
—paying one’s monthly credit card dues. Specifi-
cally, the planning prompt encouraged delinquent
credit card customers, who indicated that they
would pay within the next 3 days, to follow
through on this intention. This was done by requir-
ing these customers to select a more specific time
frame within which they would make their credit
card payment (choice between paying within 24,
36, 48, and 72 hr). This was done within an interac-
tive voice response (IVR) call with no live agent. In
doing so, we examined whether a minimal and
automatic planning prompt would be sufficient to
affect consumer choices, and consequently whether
such an intervention is a viable and scalable tool
for firms to use to influence consumer behavior.
Field Experiment
Background
While credit cards confer many benefits, they
can also be costly. In particular, for consumers who
miss paying their monthly minimum dues (or “total
due”), becoming delinquent oftentimes results in
late fees (after being 1 month delinquent) and
downgraded credit scores (typically after being
delinquent for two consecutive months). The later
makes it not only harder to access further credit but
also increases the cost of subsequent borrowing due
to a higher interest rate. In addition, since a con-
sumer’s credit report can be requested by third par-
ties, lower credit scores can create other, sometimes
less obvious challenges such as making it harder to
get a job, disqualifying oneself from getting insur-
ance coverage, and decreasing the probability of
getting a mortgage.
As a first means of communication, typically
immediately after a credit card holder has missed 1
monthly minimum payment and therefore becomes
delinquent, credit card companies make use of out-
bound IVR calls to simply alert customers to their
total due amount and elicit a response from them
whether they have just paid, will be paying with
the next 3 days, or want to speak to a live agent.
Such IVR reminder calls have the advantage of
being cheap, controlled (due to an automated
script), and able to accommodate a large volume of
transactions. The intent is to prompt payment to
remove delinquency (the account becomes “cur-
rent” if the customer pays at least the minimum
amount due) and continue regular business with
the customer.
If this first means of contact (i.e., IVR) fails and
after a customer is delinquent for two or more con-
secutive months, credit card companies typically
move to other means of communication: from live
agent calls and letters all the way to involving collec-
tion agencies, lawyers, and closing accounts. Thus, to
the extent that IVRs are effective, they can be an
economical way to intervene early on in the delin-
quency process, and potentially eliminate some of
Table 1
Typical Three-Level Structure Design of an Interactive Voice Response
(IVR) Message as First Means of Communication When a Customer is
Delinquent by 1 month (Failed to Pay the Minimum Amount Due)
Interactive Level 1—Legal Requirement
The call recipient is asked to confirm they are the right party
(They press “1” if they are the right person and press “2” they
are not the right person).
Interactive Level 2—Total Due Reminder
If the call recipient indicated they are the right party, in this
second and main interactive menu level they are informed
about their total due and asked to indicate if they have already
made that payment (Press “1”), will be making it within the
next three days (Press “2”), or want to speak to an agent (Press
“3”).
Noninteractive Level 3a—terminal message:
The call recipient’s response from the last interactive menu
level is acknowledged.
aIf the call recipient indicates they are not the right party, the
IVR moves straight to the terminal message, resulting in a two-
level structure.
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delinquency’s negative downstream consequences
for both customers and credit card companies.
The design of standard IVR messages as first
means of communication when a customer becomes
delinquent (has not paid her minimum amount due)
is based primarily on the assumption that account
holders simply forgot to pay. Therefore, if anything,
account holders only need to be reminded of their
total due amount and then they will act on it (if they
have the means). Accordingly, they have a simple
three-level structure (see Table 1).
Method
While repaying debt is generally desirable, this
intention may not be sufficient to create a repay-
ment action. Thus, to help account holders follow
through on their payment intentions, we tested
whether a minimal planning prompt could help
reduce the intention-action gap. Specifically, we
tested a condition with an added interactive menu
level right after the total due reminder and before
the terminal message, resulting in a four-level struc-
ture (legal requirement, total due reminder, plan-
ning prompt, and terminal message; see Table 2).
That is, only the call recipients who pressed 2 in
IVR level 2 and therefore indicated that they would
pay within the next 3 days were presented with the
new planning prompt menu level, which asked
them to select a more concrete time frame within
which they would make their payment (e.g., “If
you are going to pay within the next 24 hours,
press 1”; see Table 2). Thus, the four-level structure
pertains only to a subset of recipients. We expected
this intervention to prompt deeper processing and
attention that would help people remember. In
addition, we expected it to strengthen people’s
sense of having made a decision and their goal
setting.
To examine if we could strengthen this interven-
tion, we tested another condition, in which we
added an interactive menu level right after the new
planning prompt. This additional menu was
designed to further increase the motivation to act
goal-consistently through an explicit, personalized
commitment (see e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004;
Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & Bazerman, 2012) to the
concrete time frame indicated in the previous plan-
ning prompt (e.g., “Customer_Name, you have
committed to pay $TotalDue within the next 24 hr.
Table 2
Overview of the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) Script Differences Between Our Three Conditions
Control Planning Prompt
Planning prompt
+ commitment
Interactive Level 1—legal requirement
Interactive Level 2—total due reminder
New interactive Level 3—planning prompt (duration)
Only if call recipient pressed “2” in IVR Level 2:
• If you are going to pay within the next 24 hr, press 1.
• If you are going to pay within the next 36 hr, press 2.
• If you are going to pay within the next 48 hr, press 3.
• If you are going to pay within the next 72 hr, press 4.
• To return to the previous menu, press 5.
• To hear all options again, press 9.
New Interactive Level 4—active commitment
Only if call recipient pressed “1”, “2”, “3”, or “4” in IVR Level 3:
• Customer_Name, you have committed to pay
$TotalDue within the next 24/36/48/72 hr. Press
1/2/3/4 to confirm your commitment to this pledge.
• To return to the previous menu, press 5.
Terminal message
Total number of IVR levels 3 4 5
Number of participants 17,977 17,737 17,361
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Press 1 to confirm your commitment to this
pledge;” resulting in a five-level structure: legal
requirement, total due reminder, planning prompt,
commitment, and terminal message; see Table 2).
We thus tested whether the effect of the implemen-
tation intention could be strengthened through an
additional simple step (Achtziger et al., 2012).
Note, that the more menu levels we add, the
longer the entire IVR script is and thus, the more
likely a call recipient is to not respond with a key-
press in an interactive menu level and instead to
abandon the call before reaching the terminal mes-
sage. This time-trade-off works against the efficacy
of added menu levels. Furthermore, our three condi-
tions (control, planning prompt, planning
prompt + commitment) were identical in the legal
requirements level 1, the total due reminder level 2,
and the terminal message. They only differed from
each other after the IVR level 2 for the subset of call
recipients who indicated that they would make a
payment within 3 days (i.e., for recipients who
pressed 2 in IVR level 2), (Note that our three condi-
tions were based on a variation of the firm’s original
IVR script. The original experiment included three
other conditions: the firm’s original IVR script plus
two more variations. These three conditions were
conducted to test hypotheses that the firm was inter-
ested in, but which were not relevant for the current
paper. Because they were not of theoretical interest,
they were excluded from the analyses below. A
detailed description and analyses of the complete six
conditions can be found in the Methodological
Detail Appendix (MDA), (Tables S1–S3). In a nut-
shell, the firm’s original IVR script performed con-
siderably worse than all of the other conditions in
the study. The other two conditions, which were
variants of our planning prompt condition where
the firm manipulated the terminal message, per-
formed similarly to our planning prompt condition.).
For a full account of the differences see Table 2.
Data
Together with a large North American store
credit card company that has a substantial share of
higher risk, subprime customers (i.e., customers of
lower credit quality), we tested the effects of IVR
script variations on two dimensions: (a) customers’
likelihood to make the necessary payments to cure
their accounts and graduate from “delinquent (or
“past due”) to “current” by the end of the next
statement date (when one’s delinquency would
escalate to the next, more severe level) and (b)
customers’ speed (number of days) to cure their
account.
The field experiment was conducted with a ran-
dom subset of the company’s credit card accounts
that were delinquent and received an IVR call
sometime during the 9-month period from October
1, 2011 to June 30, 2012. We focus on the first con-
nected IVR call (someone picked up and therefore
was at least partially exposed to the IVR message
as opposed to no one picking up or the call going
to the answering machine) that an account holder
received during our experimental period (N =
53,075; the sample size and the duration needed to
get the sample size were determined by the credit
card company’s data analytics team before the
experiment was conducted; for descriptive data of
our sample, see Table 3; for more detail, see the
MDA provided online).
Results
Delinquency. As can be seen in Tables 4 and
5, the planning prompt reduced delinquency. In
order to focus on the effects of the differences
between our three scripts, that is, the differences
after call recipients indicated they would pay
within the next 3 days (pressed “2” in IVR level 2),
we focus our analysis on the gray-shaded columns
(N = 15,502). We present the other columns for
transparency reasons but refrain from comparing
their numbers because the effects there are contami-
nated by random differences in behavior before call
recipients were exposed to the script variations. As
can be seen in Table 4, adding an interactive menu
level with a minimalist planning prompt signifi-
cantly (p < .001) increased the likelihood to pay
one’s account current by 2.26 percentage points
(from 84.76% to 87.02%). Adding both a minimalist
planning prompt followed by an explicit, personal-
ized commitment to it significantly (p < .001)
increased the likelihood to pay one’s account cur-
rent by 2.54 percentage points (from 84.76% to
87.30%). There was no significant difference
between the effectiveness of the planning prompt
condition and the planning prompt + commitment
condition (p = .66). These results hold when con-
trolling for various account holder covariates such
as total due amount, credit limit, or account tenure,
as shown in Table 5. As exploratory analyses, we
also examined whether this effect would be moder-
ated by the size of the minimum payment due, the
total balance, their credit limit, the number of years
as customers with the firm, the total number of
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calls and the percentage of their credit limit that
they had used. None of these variables moderated
the effect.
Speed to cure. As can be seen in Tables 6 and
7, focusing on call recipients that indicated they will
pay within the next 3 days (pressed “2” in IVR
level 2; gray-shaded columns; N = 13,385; note, this
N is lower than in Tables 4 and 5 because not
everyone who indicated they would pay cured their
account), the planning prompt increased the speed
to get out of delinquency. As can be seen in
Table 6, adding an interactive menu level with a
minimalist planning prompt significantly (p < .05)
reduced the time to cure one’s account by 0.23 days
(from 3.98 to 3.75 days). Adding both a minimalist
planning prompt followed by an explicit, personal-
ized commitment to it significantly (p < .001)
reduced the time to cure one’s account by 0.51 days
(from 3.98 to 3.47 days) and by 0.29 days relative
to the planning prompt only condition (p < .01;
from 3.75 to 3.46 days). These results hold when
controlling for various account holder covariates
such as total due amount, credit limit, or account
tenure, as shown in Table 7.
Keeping one’s self-imposed time frame to pay one’s
account current. In order to better understand
why the explicit, personalized commitment condi-
tion led to increased speed of payment, we exam-
ined the likelihood of meeting their self-imposed
deadline among those who cured their account.
Table 8 shows account holders’ likelihood of meet-
ing their self-imposed deadline (based on their
response in the new planning prompt interactive
menu level 3). That is, what percentage of account
holders, who indicated they would pay within 24
(36/48/72) hr, actually made their payment within
24 (36/48/72) hr (rather than at some later time).
As can be seen in the last column of Table 8, the
explicit, personalized commitment overall signifi-
cantly increased the likelihood to meet one’s self-
imposed time frame (61.03% vs. 64.76%, p < .001).
Interestingly, there was a significant interaction
between condition and deadline selected. While the
explicit, personalized commitment condition did
not change the likelihood of meeting the shorter 24-
hr deadline, it did increase the likelihood of meet-
ing the longer deadlines (see Table S4 in the MDA
available online for formal regression analyses).
These results suggest that nonbinding but explicit,
personalized commitments can reinforce people’s
motivation to follow through on their intentions
and meet their self-imposed goals.
Table 3
Descriptive Data for the Sample
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Total due ($) 142.43 80 161.73 10 1,601.56 53,075
Balance ($) 2,832.93 1,549.65 3,293.09 10.28 21,249.85 53,075
Delinquency levela (months) 1.03 1 0.20 1 3 53,075
Credit limit 5,189.54 3,500 4,725.98 200 25,000 53,074
Account tenure (Years) 7.37 5 8.22 0 51 53,075
Account holder age (Years) 49.11 49 13.72 18 99 52,877
Number of IVR call attempts within billing cycle 1.47 1 0.72 1 19 53,075
Percentage of nondelinquent months (previous 12 months) 0.90 1 .14 0 1 52,880
aOf the sample, 96.8% was past due by 1 month. For a small subset of valued customers (in our sample 3.2%), credit card companies
allow for a longer delinquency before they start with IVR calls and subsequently more severe collection actions. Excluding these, 3.2%
does not change the results.
Table 4
Overall Likelihood to Pay One’s Account Current by Condition and Menu Level
Condition
All Calls (intention
to Treat = ITT)
Level 1, pressed “1”
(person confirms identity;
necessary to proceed to level 2)
Level 2, pressed “2”
(person agrees to pay within
3 days; necessary to proceed to level 3)
Control 74.19% 80.38% 84.76%
Planning prompt 75.98% 82.31% 87.02%
Planning prompt + commitment 74.93% 81.75% 87.30%
N 53,075 29,967 15,502
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Table 5
Logit Models of Likelihood to Pay One’s Account Current by Menu Level
All Calls
(ITT)
Level 1,
pressed “1”
Level 2,
pressed “2”
All Calls
(ITT)
Level 1,
pressed “1”
Level 2,
pressed “2”
Planning prompt 0.10*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.04) 0.19*** (0.06) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.12*** (0.04) 0.18** (0.06)
Planning prompt
+ commitment
0.04 (0.02) 0.09* (0.04) 0.21*** (0.06) 0.03 (0.03) 0.09* (0.04) 0.21*** (0.06)
Log total due 0.63*** (0.01) 0.73*** (0.02) 0.69*** (0.04)
Log credit limit 0.55*** (0.02) 0.55*** (0.02) 0.59*** (0.04)
Delinquency Level 2 1.04*** (0.06) 0*** (0) 0.9*** (0.13)
Delinquency Level 3 2.09*** (0.18) 1.19*** (0.08) 1.91*** (0.45)
# Calls 0.2*** (0.01) 1.87*** (0.27) 0.12 (0.19)
Log account tenure 0.03** (0.01) 0.1** (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Constant 1.06*** (0.02) 1.41*** (0.03) 1.72*** (0.04) 0.16 (0.09) 0.38** (0.13) 0.02 (0.27)
N 53,075 29,967 15,502 53,074 29,966 15,501
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. The credit limit for one of the customers was missing from the data. Therefore, the sample size of
the analyses with this covariate has one fewer customer.
Table 6
Mean Number of Days (and Standard Errors) Until One’s Account is Current by Condition and Menu Level
Condition
All calls (intention
to treat = ITT)
Level 1,
pressed “1”
(person confirms
identity)
Level 2, pressed “2” (person
agrees to pay within 3 days)
Control 5.89 (.06) 4.58 (.07) 3.98 (.08)
Planning prompt 5.75 (.06) 4.47 (.07) 3.75 (.08)
Planning prompt + commitment 5.63 (.06) 4.31 (.06) 3.46 (.08)
N 39,822 24,416 13,385
Table 7
Regression Models of Days to Current by Menu Level
All calls
(ITT)
Level 1,
pressed “1”
Level 2,
pressed “2” All calls (ITT)
Level 1,
pressed “1”
Level 2,
pressed “2”
Planning prompt 0.13 (0.08) 0.11 (0.09) 0.23* (0.11) 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.09) 0.20^ (0.11)
Planning prompt
+ commitment
0.25** (0.08) 0.27** (0.09) 0.51*** (0.11) 0.21** (0.07) 0.29** (0.09) 0.51*** (0.11)
Log total due 2.02*** (0.03) 1.76*** (0.04) 1.26*** (0.05)
Log credit limit 1.26*** (0.04) 1.13*** (0.05) 1.03*** (0.06)
Delinquency Level 2 0.1 (0.2) 0.22 (0.22) 0.05 (0.28)
Delinquency Level 3 1.58* (0.78) 0.70 (0.89) 0.51 (1.17)
# Calls 1.43*** (0.04) 0.51*** (0.08) 0.04 (0.33)
Log account tenure 0.09* (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.05 (0.05)
Constant 5.89*** (0.06) 4.58*** (0.07) 3.98*** (0.08) 5.06*** (0.27) 5.45*** (0.32) 6.84*** (0.5)
N 39,822 24,416 13,385 39,822 24,416 13,385
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ^the p-value here is p = .057.
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General Discussion
In this research, we showed that planning prompts
can affect routine consumer behavior. We found
that the simple act of asking delinquent consumers
to specify a more concrete time frame for paying
their credit card dues significantly increased their
likelihood of following through on their intentions.
Additionally, this intervention increased the likeli-
hood that they would do so within the agreed
upon time frame, an effect that was further
strengthened by having consumers commit to their
selected time frame. These results have important
theoretical and practical implications for the
implementation of planning prompts to consumer
settings.
Our results show that even a minimal prompt
delivered through automated IVR calls can reduce
the intention-action gap that so often prevents peo-
ple from completing beneficial behaviors and do so
for routine actions. Prior demonstrations of imple-
mentation intentions, particularly in the field, typi-
cally involved much more elaborate interventions
and nonroutine actions, which required much more
extensive plans, often involving live agent calls
(e.g., Nickerson & Rogers, 2010), physical mailers
(e.g., Milkman et al., 2011), or even in person inter-
actions (e.g., Orbell & Sheeran, 2000). In addition,
they typically involved a concrete time/date/day
cue as cognitive reminder (instead, we implement a
more practical duration prompt with a choice
between paying within 24, 36, 48, and 72 hr). While
these interventions have shown to be effective, they
are also costly, and may not scale up for firms try-
ing to change the behavior of a large number of
customers. The intervention presented in this article
cost the firm virtually nothing, and thus could be
easily scaled to its entire customer base. Moreover,
this simple intervention could be used to influence
other related behaviors where there is an intention-
behavior gap, or it could be adopted by other firms
to solve similar problems.
We additionally found that the strength of the
planning prompt intervention was further enhanced
by having consumers commit a second time to their
selected time frame. Interestingly, since this com-
mitment was done during an automated call with
no human interaction, it is unlikely that this effect
is due to others’ expectations of consistency. Rather,
this private commitment likely strengthened con-
sumers’ motivation to follow through on their goal.
This is consistent with prior research showing that
implementation intentions are moderated by the
strength of commitment to one’s plan (Achtziger
et al., 2012). However, we also expand on this
research by showing the effect of commitment on
behavioral measures (the prior research focused on
activation), and more importantly, on actual con-
sumer behavior in the field.
We found that the commitment manipulation
affected call recipients’ likelihood of meeting their
self-imposed deadline (and the overall time to cure
their account), but not the overall likelihood of cur-
ing their account. One possible explanation for this
is that, given the high levels of cure rates in the
data, we were hitting a ceiling effect on that mea-
sure. Another intriguing possibility is that since the
commitment focused mainly on the self-imposed
deadline, it had most of the effect on this measure.
Indeed, it may be the case that if consumers had
further committed to cure their account, that goal
would have been more salient, and the effect would
have been observed on that behavior.
It is also interesting that this commitment had
little effect on those who chose a self-imposed
deadline of 24 hr. Again, this null effect might be
due to ceiling effects, since this was the group who
had the highest success rate overall. It is also possi-
ble that consumers who chose the nearest possible
deadline were those who were most committed to
their plan, and consequently, those who benefitted
the least from an intervention designed to
strengthen this commitment. Future research could
Table 8
Likelihood of Meeting Self-Imposed Duration to Follow Through on One’s Payment Intentions With and Without Explicit Commitment
Condition Pay within 24 hr Pay within 36 hr Pay within 48 hr Pay within 72 hr Overall
Planning prompt 73.64% 56.90% 49.65% 46.89% 61.03%
Planning prompt + commitment 72.80% 64.88% 55.29% 54.03% 64.76%
Difference 0.84% 7.98% 5.64% 7.14% 3.73%
p .58 .001 .05 .01 .001
N 3,459 2,035 1,161 1,570 8,216
Note. N = 8,216 here is smaller than N = 15,502 in Table 4 because this is excluding the control condition, and we only focus on cured
account holders who selected a specific time frame during interactive level 3.
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continue to examine the interplay between planning
prompts and commitment to specific aspects of
them.
In addition, our results may shed some light on
the pathways that lead to behavioral change. Four
pathways have been posited for the effect of plan-
ning prompts (Beshears, Milkman, & Schwartzstein,
2016; Rogers, Milkman, John, & Norton, 2015): Our
intervention did not involve asking explicitly how
the problem would be solved, suggesting that (a)
the mechanical pathway played a small role in the
observed effect. Additionally, our participants did
not receive any kind of physical reminder (e.g., a
card they could display on their refrigerators
reminding them to follow through on their inten-
tions), suggesting that (b) the physical pathway also
played a small role. Therefore, our results support
the notion that the (c) cognitive (deeper processing
and attention) and (d) motivational pathways (goal
setting) may be sufficient to affect behavior. Indeed,
to further support the hypothesis that our planning
prompt did not likely operate via the mechanical
pathway, we re-ran our analyses without account
holders who paid in-store (the most difficult/com-
plex way with the most obstacles to overcome).
Excluding these observations did not change the
results: the planning prompt continued to be effec-
tive (see MDA Table S5 for formal regression analy-
ses). Thus, while the mechanical and physical
pathways may help strengthen the effect, our
results suggest that they are not necessary for it to
occur. This is an important finding for firms inter-
ested in using this tool to influence consumer
behavior, since physical reminders and personal-
ized live agent calls designed to help consumers
develop more concrete plans tend to be costlier
interventions that are more difficult to scale up.
Our intervention has some similarities with the
well-established mere-measurement (Morwitz &
Fitzsimons, 2004; Morwitz, Johnson, & Schmittlein,
1993) and question-behavior effects (Spangenberg,
Greenwald, & Sprott, 2008; Spangenberg, Kareklas,
Devezer, & Sprott, 2016), which show that asking
consumers questions about a particular behavior
affects their likelihood of performing that behavior.
Nonetheless, the focus of this intervention was on
the effect of forming a more concrete action plan
(i.e., instead of only confirming a standard 3-day
action window, concretizing an hours-window),
rather than on the effect of a single question about
a particular behavior. Indeed, participants in all
conditions were asked about their intentions to pay
off their debt. Thus, while participants in this study
likely benefited from the question-behavior effect,
its effect was constant across the conditions and not
the focus of this project.
In addition to generalizing the effects of imple-
mentation intentions to novel settings, this manu-
script makes a contribution to the growing body of
research in consumer behavior focusing on how to
help consumers better manage their debt to reduce
the costs from credit card loans. This is an impor-
tant problem, in 2013, 38% of all households in the
United States carried some sort of credit card debt
(Federal Reserve, 2014) and the total outstand-
ing credit card debt in the United States was set to
hit $1 trillion in 2016 (Andriotis & Sidel, 2016).
Additionally, a 2012 national survey (Traub &
Ruetschlin, 2012) found that 28% of low- and mod-
erate-income households reported accruing late fees
in the past year due to delinquency, and about 29%
of those who were delinquent reported that their
interest rate increased as a consequence.
It is true that credit card companies benefit from
customers carrying debt. However, the tipping
point of this gamble is when customers become
delinquent, at which point they switch from being
an asset to the firm to being a cost to the firm. Prior
research has focused in particular on helping con-
sumers prioritize which debt to pay off first (see
e.g., Amar, Ariely, Ayal, Cryder, & Rick, 2011;
Brown & Lahey, 2015; Kettle, Trudel, Blanchard, &
H€aubl, 2016) and how to get credit card customers
pay off more of their statement balance (Hershfield
& Roese, 2015) to reduce monthly interest charges.
We extend this body of research by focusing on
delinquency, that is, how to help consumers, who
missed paying their minimum dues, to become
“current” again and potentially to also improve
other aspects of their financial health. More
broadly, this research illustrates a path to help
consumers make better choices and credit card
companies to reduce their costs, by closing the
implementation intentions gap.
In sum, our results suggest that small changes to
an automated IVR script can significantly alter
behavior in a context that is typically assumed to
not offer much room for nudging interventions.
Specifically, our results show that in comparison to
the traditional approach of reminding customers of
their outstanding debt and prompting an action to
pay within 3 days, adding a minimal planning
prompt for an otherwise routine transaction is
enough to significantly reduce delinquency and
increase the average speed by which delinquent
account holders set their accounts in order. As such
this intervention was quite beneficial for the firm
we collaborated with and its customers. Given that
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the planning prompt increased the percentage of
customers who cured their account by 1.79 percent-
age points in the intention-to-treat analyses
(Table 4), and the entire experiment population (a
fraction of the firm’s overall client population) was
223,574, we can infer that roughly 4002 more cus-
tomers would have cured their account if this inter-
vention had been applied to the entire experiment
population (and substantially more than that num-
ber if the intervention had been applied to the
firm’s entire client population). Moreover, this still
does not take into account that every day new cus-
tomers become delinquent, so the long-term benefit
would be much larger than this. It is also important
to keep in mind that with customers who fail to
cure their account, the credit card company then
resorts to live agent calls (which are costly), and
eventually sends the accounts to collection agencies,
where they can expect to only recover a fraction of
the debt. The value of this intervention is further
augmented by the fact that it costs the firm virtu-
ally nothing to implement. Thus, for our partnering
credit card company our intervention translated
into the immediate collection of additional total
dues and a reduction in further collection efforts
and costs. Meanwhile, the consumers involved in
the intervention benefitted from avoiding the costs
associating with being delinquent on one’s debt.
Finally, it is worthwhile pointing out that some-
times even simple “intuitive” improvements can
already dramatically affect behavior. For example,
our control condition had three key improvements
over the firm’s original message: we increased the
sense of urgency in the interactive menu 1 to break
through the marketing clutter, added more informa-
tion in the interactive menu 2 to improve debt liter-
acy, and, to improve the customer relationship,
created a friendly and more human terminal
message (see MDA for more details). These intu-
itive changes increased the likelihood to pay one’s
account to a comparable degree as the theoretically
grounded implementation intentions-intervention
that we describe in this paper (see Table S3). This
suggests that when applying behavioral insights to
real-world problems, there may be much “low
hanging fruit.”
While it is possible that the improvement in
repayment to the focal credit card came at the
expense of other debts, our results suggest that
delinquency is not simply an outcome of either for-
getting or sheer inability to make a payment.
Instead, delinquency might also be due to nonspeci-
fic plans to follow through on one’s payment
intentions, in particular a lack of cognition and
motivation. More generally, the randomized control
trial reported in this paper demonstrates the power
of relevant psychological interventions for increas-
ing economic and individual well-being in a rela-
tively costless manner.
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